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ABSTRACT 
 
Limited liability has been seen as crucial for the development of capital markets. In this 
paper  I  use  the  CAPM  to  analyze  how  a  company  is  priced  differently  under  different 
liability regimes. I reach the conclusion that as far as the pricing and liquidity of shares is 
concerned,  the  positive  features  of  a  limited  liability  regime  are  common  to  “pro  rata” 
unlimited liability. The prevalence of the unlimited liability regime over regimes of unlimited 
liability, prorata (or joint and several) should then be traced in other benefits that limiting 
liability  may  bring.  Literature  and  history  point  to  the  relationship  between  bankruptcy 
procedures and liability regimes as the area where the limited liability regimes may be more 
cost effective and easier to implement. 
   3
INTRODUCTION 
 
The introduction of limited liability in company law has been the object of a wide body of 
studies.  This  change  in  institutional  arrangements  has  been  studied  thoroughly  by  law 
historians (B.C. Hunt, 1969 and R.R. Formoy, 1923; to mention but two), and has been a 
fertile  ground  for  the  application  of  economic  theory  to  law.  The  introduction  of  limited 
liability has been seen as the introduction of an institution that solves several problems 
connected with the development of economic activity in associated form and it has been 
seen  as  crucial  to  development  of  capital  markets  (F.H.  Easterbrook  and  D.R.  Fischel, 
1985, S. Woodward 1985). In extreme synthesis the argument moves along the following 
lines: limited liability makes shareholders’ wealth irrelevant for the company’s value, for 
shareholders and investors there is no need to monitor the wealth of other shareholders, 
the value of the company only reflects information about the company itself, shares in one 
company are perfectly homogeneous, there is no scope for strategic behaviour in terms of 
shares’ trading and the shares’ price is unique. Under these circumstances a market for 
shares can more easily develop. When company’s shares are perfectly homogeneous and 
no  strategic  trade  can  take  place  investors  may  efficiently  diversify  their  portfolio  to 
maximize  their  utility.  Managers  maximize  the  shareholders  utility  by  maximizing  the 
company value. The economic analysis of limited liability has a comparative element and 
the features of a limited liability’s regime are contrasted with the features of an unlimited 
liability regime. The comparison between limited and unlimited liability regimes is however 
difficult because many different unlimited liability regimes are possible (R. Kraakman 1998). 
In most studies the features of a limited liability regime are compared with the features of 
regime of joint and several liability.  
  In this paper I will use a well known finance model of asset pricing, the CAPM, and I 
will analyze how the same economic enterprise is priced differently under different liability 
regimes. The analysis, developed as a comparative static exercise,  leads to the conclusion 
that many of the positive features of a limited liability regime can be found in the so called 
“pro rata” unlimited liability regime. This last regime sees shareholders liable for  a share of 
company’s liabilities which is not limited to a fix amount (the amount of the company’s 
capital), but instead it varies with company’s liabilities and it is proportional to their shares’ 
holding. Having highlighted that many of the benefits attributed to limited liability are not 
exclusive  to  this  regime,  I  then  suggest  that  an  explanation  and  justification  for  the 
introduction of limited liability should take into account other features of company’s law.   4
  The paper is organized in the following way: paragraph one contains a review of the 
literature; paragraph two contains some details of the CAPM and investigates how different 
liability regimes would determine share prices; paragraph three contains a discussion of the 
results; conclusions follow. 
 
 
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The introduction of the regime of limited liability in modern company law has been widely 
studied and the body of the literature supports the view that a regime of limited liability 
reduces information and transaction costs for investors and it enhances the marketability of 
shares. The combined effect of these two factors makes it a necessary condition for the 
development of stock-markets and the legal framework of choice for large firms.  
  The information and transaction costs for investors are seen to be higher under a 
regime  of  unlimited  liability  (joint  and  several  unlimited  liability  in  Jensen  and  Meckling 
1976) because the wealth of each investor determines the amount of negative payoff that 
other investor may face. Investors have then an incentive to monitor other shareholders’ 
wealth and they should bear the cost of this activity. Since investors’ expected payoff is 
affected by the wealth of the other shareholders (the wealthier the other shareholders are 
the higher is the expected payoff for all of them) to maximize their wealth investors may 
devote  resources  to  limit  the  transferability  of  shares.  Costs  may  arise  to  limit  the 
transferability  of  shares  and  effective  limits  to  asset  transferability  wouldn’t  allow  the 
development  of efficient  capital markets.  A similar  argument  is  extended  by Woodward 
(1985) to regimes of prorata unlimited liability and it is developed further by Winton (1993) 
which  highlights  the  effect  of  the  liability  regime  on  the  ownership  structure  of  the firm 
concluding that in a regime of unlimited liability restriction on shares transferability would be 
an alternative to adverse selection among shareholders. According to J. L. Carr and G. F. 
Matthewson (1988) investors need of assessing each-other’s wealth and of limiting shares 
transferability would generate expected smaller size for companies set up in an unlimited 
liability regime.   
  The connection between shareholders wealth and company’s payoffs is developed 
as well by taking into account the effects that different liability regimes may have on the 
company’s cost of capital: since shareholders wealth is a collateral for creditors it has an 
effect on the cost of credit (the wealthier are the shareholders the lower should be the cost 
of credit). In a world of perfect capital markets these secondary effects would compensate   5
the  reduction  of  the  negative  payoffs  connected  with  liability  limitation  (P.Halpern, 
M.Trebilcock,  S.Turnbull,  1980)  and  the  company’s  value  wouldn’t  be  affected  by  the 
choice of liability regime.  
  The  bulk  of  the  theoretical  literature  shares  the  approach  that  different  liability 
regimes are associated with different information and transaction costs. Unlimited liability is 
seen as a regime with higher information and transaction costs for investors and then a 
regime that hampers the development of capital market and the growth of the firm. 
 
 
2.  ASSETS’ VALUATION AND ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY REGIME 
 
2.1  The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
One common feature of the studies in the economics of limited liability is to take the view 
that shareholders’ utility is a function of the company’s value and that the company’s value 
is a function uniquely of the company’s expected payoff.   
  In what follows I take a slightly different approach using the mean-variance approach 
to asset evaluation  as summarised in the CAPM.  The mean-variance approach to finance 
is based on an investors’ utility maximization model. In this model, investors’ utility depends 
on  the  mean  and  variance  of  portfolio’s  return  and  broadly  speaking  an  increase  in 
expected  return  increases  investors’  utility  while  an  increase  in  return’s  variability 
decreases it. Assets’ return is seen as a random variable with a known expected value and 
a  known  variance.  Different  combinations  of  assets  generate  different  combinations  of 
expected return and return’s variability. Since for any given expected return the investor’s 
utility is higher when the return’s variability is lower, only the combinations of assets that 
generate the highest return for any given level of return variability represent the efficient 
opportunity  set  for  the  investors.  To  maximize  their  utility  investors  only  decide  how  to 
invest  their  wealth  among  different  assets.  Central  to  this  approach  is  the  idea  that 
changing the portfolio’s composition investors will change simultaneously their expected 
return and its variability.  Since this model is well established and widely know we do not 
rework here the analytics of it and we refer to Appendix A for a summary of the main points 
(for  a  detailed  presentation  of  the  model  see  for  example  Fama  and  Miller,  1972  or 
Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). The development of this utility maximization model allows to 
derive simple rules for asset pricing. The price (or value) of a company is given by the 
expected  company’s  payoff  discounted  at  a  risk  free  rate  of  return  minus  (or  plus)  an   6
adjustment factor that relates the variability of the company’s return to the variability of the 
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 is the adjustment factor. This adjustment factor takes into 
account the so called price of risk reduction  Q  (usually interpreted as the reduction in 
return that on the market as a whole has to be accepted for a reduction of its variability) 
and a measure of the contribution that a company gives to the variability of the market 
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  According to this model the price of a single share is simply a fraction of the price of 
the whole company.  This last conclusion rests on the hypothesis that each company’s 
share  generates  a  constant  and  equal  part  of  the  company’s  payoff.  Under  these 
circumstances  if  the  company’s  ownership  is  divided  in  N   shares  each  share’s  payoff 
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Replacing these measures into [2.1] the price of each share will then be   
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2.2  Unlimited liability regime 
If the company is set up in a regime of unlimited liability, and with unlimited liability regime 
_______ 
  If variability of the return is interpreted as the riskiness of the investment the adjustment factor relates the 
riskiness of the company to the riskiness of the market as a whole. 
   7
we refer to a regime of joint and several unlimited liability, a stockholder is usually entitled 
to a share of the positive payoffs which is proportional to his stockholding but he may be 
liable for a share of the negative payoffs which doesn’t relate directly to his stockholding. 
Creditors may claim from a single stockholder any part of the negative payoff that may 
occur.  
  While the ownership of the whole company may be priced according to [2.1] , the 
price  for  some  part  of  the  company  can’t  be  derived  form  [2.2]  nor  changes  in  the 
stockholding will change price according to it. If the company’s stock is divided in N units 
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p  and where  0 ≤ g < 1 represents the percentage of the 
negative payoff that a stockholder may be liable for. Two different interpretations may be 
given  for  g  :  g  may  be  seen  as  a  totally  independent  variable  if  no  action  from  the 
stockholder may affect it, or it may be seen as a variable whose size may be determined by 
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 meaning that g  may 
be affected by the amount of stock which is owned,. 
  According  to  some  authors  g  depends  in  fact  from  the  stockholder’s  wealth  in 
absolute terms and in relation to the wealth of other stockholders. If a stockholder has no 
wealth beside what’s invested in this company  g = 0. If each stockholder is able to face his 
share of the company’s liability and the wealth of each stockholder is equally accessible to 
creditors, g =  z/N. If not all stockholders are able to face their share of the company’s 
liabilities, or if the wealth of each stockholder is not equally accessible to creditors, g > z/N 
for the stockholders with enough accessible wealth. If recovery costs or procedural  
_______ 
2 lets assume there are l+m possible states of the world each occurring with probability  i p , in l states of the 
world the expected payoff is negative and in m states of the world the expected payoff is positive. The 
expected  payoff may  be  interpreted  as  the  net  capital  a  company  generates,  which  may  be  positive  or 
negative.   8
difficulties induce creditors to pursue among the stockholders the ones which are wealthier 
and those stockholders whose wealth is more easily sized, g  will be closer to 0 or to 1 for a 
stockholder  according  to  his  ranking  in  term  of  size  and  accessibility  of  his  wealth 
compared with the wealth of the other stockholders.  These considerations about the g’s 
size and its determinant are used when its’ argued that in a regime of unlimited liability 
adverse  selection  would  arise  among  shareholders,  when  it’s  argued  that  company’s 
ownership would be concentrated in the hand of few wealthy stockholders, when its’ argued 
that strategic trading would take place and when its’ argued that capital markets would 
always avoid unlimited liability.  
  The  need  to  assess  and  to  monitor  g    and  g’s  determinants  (other  shareholders 
wealth, mainly) is then considered a source of costs that investors need to sustain on top of 
the costs necessary to assess and  to monitor  i iC p  (i=1,l+m). 
  As far as the pricing of the company’s partial ownership is concerned the fact that 
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has as a consequence that 
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and then the price of a single share isn’t a constant fraction of the value of the whole 
company.   
  Since the acquisition (or sale) of one further unit of stock doesn’t change the amount 
of negative payoff (liabilities) which a shareholder may face in the same way as it changes 
the  amount  of  positive  payoff  he  is  entitled  to,    the  price  of  shares  isn’t  unique.(see 
appendix for a formal demonstration). 
  The cost for investors to monitor two sets of variables (g  and  i ic p ) and the non-
uniqueness of stock-unit’s prices are the two main arguments for the widely held belief that 
a regime of unlimited liability hampers the development of capital markets.  
 
2.3  “Pro rata” unlimited liability regime 
If the same company is set up in a regime of pro rata unlimited liability, a stockholder is 
entitled to a share of the positive payoffs which is proportional to his stockholding and he   9
may  be  liable  for  a  share  of  the  negative  payoffs  which  is  as  well  proportional  to  his 
stockholding.  
  Under  such  regime  the  ownership  of  z  units  of  stock  will  generate  an  expected 
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and its contribution to markets’ return variability will be 
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The price of a single share will then be defined according to [2.2] and it will be unique. 
Under such regime, stock’s price is unique and it changes only with changes in company’s 
expected payoffs ( i ic p ).  For investors there is only the need to monitor and to assess 
company’s behaviour, without any need to monitor other shareholders’ wealth. 
 
2.4  Limited liability regime 
If the same company is set up in a regime limited liability, a stockholder is entitled to a 
share of the positive payoffs which is proportional to his stockholding but he won’t be liable 
for any possible negative payoff in excess to the company capital. 
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Since  the  negative  entries  have  been  replaced  by  zeros,  the  expected  payoff from  the 
whole company will be larger 
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and  the  payoffs’  variability  will  be  smaller.  The  limited  liability  regime  then  affects  the 
expected payoff from the company and its variability, increasing the first and decreasing the 
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And the relationship between the price of the company and the price of a single share is 





ll = . 
  In a limited liability regime investors clearly do not need to monitor and assess other 
shareholders wealth and ability to face their liabilities, but they only need to monitor and 
assess information about the possible company’s payoff, and the share price is unique. 
  According to the literature the choice of the liability regime has no effect on the value 
of a company as a whole because secondary market effects will take place. When capital 
markets  are  “perfect”,  if  shareholders’  wealth  doesn’t  represent  a  form  of  collateral  for 
creditor, these will charge a risk premium on their loans or other form of credit and that will 
rise the cost of capital for the company. If these secondary market effects take place they 
could change the size of the expected positive payoffs in such a way that  
) ( ) ( C E C E ll = . 
It’s worthy notice, that the variability of the company’s payoffs will still be smaller when a 
company is set up under a regime of limited liability than when it is set up in  a regime of 
unlimited liability (see appendix for the details). When using the CAPM to determine the 
company value and the effect of different liability regimes it becomes clear that the price of 
the company as a whole is defined by two elements: the company’s expected payoff   ) (C E  
and the product of the price of risk reduction times a measure of the contribution that the 
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under alternative liability regimes. Since   ( ) M C C, s  can be either positive or negative (or 
zero) and under different liability regimes it can change not only its size but its sign as well, 
a change of the price of the company can not be ruled out and no prediction can be made 
about this change. Using the CAPM to value a company it becomes then clear the liability 
regime isn’t neutral for the value of the company.  
 
2.5    Asset pricing and liability regimes: a summary. 
From the analysis we have done in the previous paragraphs it emerges that in the context 
of the CAPM different liability regimes for shareholders do affect the determination of share   11
prices in two different ways: determining the price of the company as a whole and defining 
the relationship between the price of a company as a whole and the price of single shares.  
As far as the price of the company as a whole is concerned a difference exists between a 
regime of limited liability on one side and the regimes of unlimited and prorata unlimited 
liability on the other. Under the first type of regime no negative payoff can take place and 
then  the  expected  payoff  for  the  same  economic  enterprise  will  be  less  variable  and 
possibly higher (if capital markets are less than perfect anyway) under this regime than it 
would  be  under  the  other  two.  Under  unlimited  and  prorata  unlimited  liability  regimes, 
negative payoffs can be generated by the company and the difference between these two 
regimes rests on the way negative payoffs are allocated among stockholders.  
  As  far  as  the  relationship  between  the  company’s  price  and  the  price  of  single 
shares is concerned, the price of single shares is unique and equal to the price of the 
company divided by the number of shares whenever shareholders are entitled to the same 
fraction of positive and negative company’s payoff, being these positive or negative or zero. 
In  this  respect there  is  no  difference  between proportional  unlimited  liability  and  limited 
liability. Under both these regimes the price of shares is uniquely determined as a constant 
fraction of the company price. A regime of prorata unlimited liability and a regime of limited 
liability can be seen as equivalent because under both regimes  
o  shareholders only have to monitor and to assess the company’s information about 
future payoffs; under the hypothesis that assessing negative payoffs doesn’t cost more 
than assessing positive and zero payoff, the two regimes generate the same information 
costs for shareholders; 
o  investors have no incentive to restrict shares marketability since other shareholders 
wealth doesn’t affect the company’s value and the shares’ price; 
o  the price of shares is unique, and shares in a company are perfectly homogeneous 
giving  to  any  shareholder  the  same  rights  and  liabilities.  Under  these  conditions  no 
strategic trading can take place and shares become liquid assets. 
None of these features can be found in the unlimited liability regime. Under this regime the 
relationship between company price and shares’ price is not unique and constant. Shares’ 
prices depend both on the ability to pay of other shareholders and on the amount of shares 
already owned by an investor.  
 
3.  LIABILITY  REGIMES  AND  CAPITAL  MARKETS:  NOT  AT  ALL  A  NECESSARY 
CONDITION.   12
The approach I followed in this paper was to start from an (elementary) asset pricing model 
and  to  see  how  different  liability  regimes  affect  the  company  valuation.  Following  this 
approach  it  becomes  clear  that  different  liability  regimes  affect  the  price  of  a  whole 
company and they affect the way shares’ price is determined. In this analysis a limited 
liability regime is furthermore contrasted with a regime of unlimited joint and several liability 
and a regime of prorata unlimited liability.  
  From the analysis it emerges that as far as the company valuation is concerned a 
difference can be found between limited liability on one side and unlimited prorata or joint 
and several liability on the other.  
  This result does contrast with the widely held view that the company value is not 
affected  by  the  liability  regime  under  which  it  is  established  when  capital  market  are 
“perfect”. The irrelevance of the liability regime for the company value is built around the 
idea that limitation in liability shifts the risks from equity holders to credit-holders and when 
capital market are perfect credit-holders will charge the company a risk-premium that will 
reduce the expected positive payoffs to such an extent that the company’s expected payoff 
is  exactly  the  same  both  under  limited  and  unlimited  liability.  Using  the  CAPM  the 
company’s price depends not only by the expected payoff but from its correlation with the 
payoff of the other existing assets (the whole asset market in fact) and even if different 
liability regimes may not affect the expected payoff they still affect in an unpredictable way 
the correlation between the company’s payoff and the payoff from the market.  
  The use of the CAPM to define the relationship between the company’s price and 
the single share’s price highlights that in this respect the main difference is between joint 
and  several  unlimited  liability  on  one  side  and  prorata  unlimited  liability  and  joint  and 
several limited liability on the other. Under the two last regimes shares’ price is uniquely 
determined  as  a  fix  part  of  the  company’s  price  and  investors  only  need  to  monitor 
company’s  expected  payoff.  Under  both  prorata  unlimited  liability  and  limited  liability 
investors  face  the  same  information  costs  and  have  no  incentive  to  restrict  shares 
transferability. From this analysis it would follow that stock-markets could work, grow and 
allow firm’s growth under both limited and prorata unlimited regimes.  
 
3.1 Empirical evidence from the market’s behaviour under different liability regimes. 
The connection between companies’ liability regime and the development of equity markets 
has been investigated in detail from a theoretical point of view and a body of literature has   13
developed,  mainly  recently,  where  authors  investigate  historical  companies’  and  market 
records to find evidence supporting or rejecting the theoretical claims.  
Historically the limited liability regime became ubiquitous where and when  stock markets 
did develop but 
o  in California the limited liability regime succeeded a regime of pro rata unlimited liability 
only in 1931 (Weinstein, 2001, 2003) and, always in the USA, there is the important 
case of American Express remaining subject to pro rata unlimited liability until 1965 
(Grossman, 1995); 
o  in  the  United  Kingdom  stock  markets’  records  report  that  up  to  the  early  eighteen 
eighties  banks  were  actively  traded  that  were  unlimited  liability  companies  (C.  R. 
Hickson, J. D. Turner 2003; G. G. Acheson and J. D. Turner 2004 and 2007; C. R. 
Hickson, J. D. Turner, C. McCann 2005). 
 
The studies on Californian companies and on American Express show that share prices 
and  companies’  value  didn’t  change  when  companies  went  from  a  regime  of  pro  rata 
unlimited liability to a regime of limited liability. This evidence is definitely compatible with 
the result of our model in two ways. First equity in companies subject to a pro rata limited 
liability regime may be traded in fully developed equity markets. Second when a company 
moves from a regime of pro rata unlimited liability to a regime of limited liability the share 
price doesn’t necessarily move up because changes in the expected pay-off may be offset 
by changes in the covariance between the company’s expected pay-off and the market’s  
expected pay-off. 
 
In the United Kingdom limited liability has been available at least form the seventeenth 
century  through  incorporation  granted  either  by  the  Crown  or  Parliament
3,  it  became 
available through a simpler registration process in 1855 (Limited Liability Act, 18 & 19 Vict. 
c.133) but for banks that were subject to a different legislation. Banks could register as 
limited only after 1858 but liability’s limitation was excluded for any notes’ issue (Joint Stock 
Banking Companies Act 21 & 22 Vict. c.91). In 1879 legislation was passed that allowed 
banks to achieve a reduction of the shareholders’ liability (Companies  Act 42 & 43 Vict. 
c.76) though not quite complete limited liability. Liability still remained unlimited as far as 
notes’ issue was concerned and since shareholders should have contributed toward 
_____________    
3  The most  widely  known  example  is  the  Bank  of  England  chartered  in1694  but  incorporation  by  Royal 
Charter was possible well before: for example  The Russia Company was incorporated by Royal charter in 
1554.   14
 
general creditors for a sum equal to the part of the general assets used to pay the notes-
holders, companies’ general assets were first a guarantee for general creditors
4. What this 
legislation allowed was, first for banks that were registered as unlimited to set a cap on the 
amount of capital that shareholders could be called to pay outside a winding up procedure, 
second for banks to create a further guarantee for general creditors (i.e. depositors) without 
actually  calling  for  any  capital  and  with  the  guarantee  for  the  shareholders  that  such 
extended guarantee wouldn’t have been callable outside a winding up procedure, third to 
allow the whole guarantee for general creditors to be limited and shared on  a pro rata 
basis (each shareholders should contribute toward non note-holders creditors only to the 
limit of the unpaid part of its own shareholding. It’s worthy noticing that within the limit of the 
unpaid part of the shareholding what amount of the unpaid capital would have been called 
did depend from the ability of other shareholders to supply their part of extra capital)
5. 
Stock markets
6 records report trading in shares of banks that were subject to  limited 
_____________    
4 For the notes issue section six of the Joint Stock Banking Act 1879, prescribed that “…… A bank of issue 
registered as limited company either before or after the passing of this act, shall not be entitled to limited 
liability in respect to its notes; and the members thereof shall continue liable in respects of its notes in the 
same manner as if it has been registered as an unlimited company; but in case the general assets of the 
company are, in the event of the company being wound up, insufficient to satisfy the claims of both the note-
holders and the general creditors, then the members after satisfying the remaining demands of the note-
holders, shall be liable to contribute toward payments of the debt of the general creditors a sum equal to the 
amount received by the note-holders out of the general assets of the company. For the purposes of this 
section the expression “ the general assets of the company ” means the funds available for payments of the 
general creditors as well as the note-holders”. To see how shareholders’ liability would have been the same 
under 1858 and 1879 legislation lets consider the contribution shareholders should have given in the case of 
a limited liability bank having £50 of assets and liabilities for £100 (£65 deposits, £10 notes, £ 25 equity). 
Under 1858 legislation all assets would have gone to depositors and shareholders should have contributed 
£10 for the issued notes on a joint and several liability principle. Under 1879 legislation £10 pounds of the 
existing assets should have gone to the note-holders but since the remaining assets were not sufficient to 
satisfy  the  depositors  shareholders  should  have  still  contributed  for  £10  on  a  joint  and  several  liability 
principle. 
5 For  the  registration  under  the  Joint  Stock  Banking  Act  1879,  section  five  prescribed  that  “An  unlimited 
liability company may …… increase the nominal amount of its capital by increasing the nominal value of its 
shares provided always that no part of such increase shall be capable of being called upon, except in the 
event of and for the purposes of the company being wound up. And in cases where no such increase of 
nominal capital may be resolved upon an unlimited liability company may, by such resolution as aforesaid, 
provide that a portion of its uncalled capital shall not be capable of being called upon, except in the event of 
and for the purposes of the company being wound up.”  
6 During the third quarter of the eighteenth century in the United Kingdom stock markets were active in many 
towns (Thomas, 1973). Each market had its own list of traded shares and companies were traded mainly just 
in some of these markets. London itself didn’t represent the main market nor provide a market at all for many 
shares that were traded in the provinces (Cottrell, 1997). If we allow for information about a company and/or 
its ownership to be easier/cheaper to gather locally than on a wider market, local markets may have an 
advantage on larger markets in terms of trading assets whose evaluation requires more information. Mahate 
(1993) suggests that the Edinburgh and Glasgow markets, where the Glasgow Bank (an unlimited liability 
bank) was mainly traded were more efficient than other British markets to handle the information about its 
failure in 1878. 
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liability, obtained via an act of Parliament or a Royal Charter, and trading in shares of 
banks that were subject to joint and several unlimited liability till the mid eighteen eighties. 
Furthermore data are available recording the market reaction to a change in liability regime, 
since  many  of  the  unlimited  liability  banks,  whose  shares  were  traded,  reregistered  as 
limited liability banks in the years following the introduction of the Companies  Act 42 & 43 
Vict.  c.76.    The  studies  on  these  stock  markets  record  and  the  studies  on  companies’ 
archives are supporting the findings that while joint and several unlimited liability may be 
hampering the development of equity markets, limiting liability doesn’t necessarily imply an 
increase in company’s value and in shares’ prices. Markets did exist for banks subject to 
joint and several unlimited liability but these banks are shown to have been smaller than 
limited liability banks
7, to have in fact devoted considerable management and shareholders’ 
time to veto shares transfers (i.e. to have carried high transaction costs) and to have been 
(as  expected)  less  frequently  traded  than  limited  liability  banks  showing  the  feature  of 
“sticky prices” (C. R. Hickson, J. D. Turner 2003; G. G. Acheson and J. D. Turner 2004).  
The study of market prices when the Ulster Banking Company did change its status from 
unlimited to limited liability shows no sign of a structural change and an increase (C.R. 
Hickson, J. D. Turner, C. McCann 2005) 
8, not differently from the American Express case.  
 
4.  OTHER BENEFITS FROM LIMITED LIABILITY 
The  empirical  evidence  indicates  that  equity  markets  can  operate  and  develop  under 
liability regime other than limited liability and the justification of the prevalence of the limited 
liability regime could be investigated considering more directly the costs of enforcing  
_____________    
7 Hickson and Turner (2003) report that limited liability banks were larger in terms of total assets’ value, in 
terms of  number of shareholders, and above all in terms of assets per shareholder. 
8 The study of market reaction to registration under the Joint Stocks Bank Act 1879 of British banks that 
were already traded as unlimited liability banks is to be interpreted with some caution. First because liability 
was reduced but not limited, second because in many cases when banks did re-register they increased the 
nominal capital significantly setting up a larger guarantee for depositors. In the case of the Ulster Bank the 
nominal ordinary capital was increased from £1,200,000 to £1,800,000 while the paid capital went from to 
£300,000 to £400,000 (C.R. Hickson, J. D. Turner, C. McCann 2005). It can not be excluded that these 
nominal capital increases could well match the expected negative capital to be supplied by the shareholders 
under a regime of unlimited liability. Other Banks did increase their nominal capital much more, for example: 
the Provincial Bank of Ireland divided its 20,000 ordinary shares of £100 (£25 paid) into n, 40,000 ordinary 
shares  of  £50  (£12.5  paid)  and  then  the  nominal  amount  of  the  share  was  raised  to  £100  so  that  the 
shareholders that were liable towards the company for a total of £1,500,000 were now liable toward the 
company for £3,500,000; the City Bank increased the nominal value of its 68,000 shares from £20 (£10 paid) 
to £40 (still £10 paid) so that the shareholders that were liable towards the company for a total of £680,000 
were now liable toward the company for £2,400,000; the Clydesdale Bank increased its nominal capital from 
£1,000,000 to £5,000,000, paid capital remaining unchanged to £1,000,000 so that the shareholders that 
were liable towards the company for a total of £ 0 were now liable toward the company for £4,000,000 
(source the Stock Exchange Yearbook, various issues).   16
unlimited liability.  
According to the theoretical literature the real  effectiveness of unlimited liability (prorata or 
joint and several) may be quite modest as suggested by Manne (1967) and more recently 
by Grundfest (1992) and unlimited liability is almost certainly costly to  enforce. How costly 
and how difficult to enforce is unlimited liability depends from bankruptcy legislation and 
procedure according to  H.Hansmann and R.Kraakman (1992) and H.Hansmann, et al. 
(2006) so that these costs can be reduced by an adequate legislation.  
Empirical investigations on the failure in 1878 of the City of Glasgow Bank (CGB), a bank 
subject to joint and several unlimited liability whose shares were actively traded mainly in 
Edinburgh and Glasgow provides case evidence on the issue. According to Acheson and 
Turner  (2007)  in  eighteen  eighty  Scotland  unlimited  liability  proved  to  be  effective,  all 
creditors of the bank being satisfied, to be efficient in terms of timing, the final call on 
shareholders  taking  place  about  seven  month  after  the  beginning  of  the  winding  up 
procedure, and the expected unravelling of the shares’ ownership didn’t take place. The 
authors conclude then that joint and several unlimited liability was not such an ineffective 
regime even for large companies whose shares were traded on equity markets. The same 
authors acknowledge however that the effectiveness of the winding up procedure is due to 
some  other  institutional  arrangements  including:  non  anonymity  in  shares’  trade
9,  the 
existence  a  three  year  post  sale  liability  for  past  shareholders
10  and  the  fact  that  the 
company had a core of wealthy shareholders that were allowed by the company’s deed of 
settlement  to  veto  shares’  transfer
11.  On  the  point  of  the  unravelling  of  the  company’s 
ownership on the wake of failure, Acheson’s and Turner’s evidence from the CGB failures 
contradicts Mahate (1993). This author claims that ownership of the Caledonian Bank, a 
bank that had obtained as collateral four shares in the failed CGB, did in fact unravel when 
the bank went into liquidation because of CGB’s failure (eventually the CGB liquidators 
made a call on the Caledonian Bank worthy about half its annual profit,  Caledonian’s   
__________    
9 Since 1867, under 30 Vict., c.29 (the so called Leeman’s Act) any contract for the sale of bank’s shares  
null and void to unless it set forth the numbers of the shares or the proprietor’s name as registered in the 
company’ books. Contemporary authors suggests however that the Act was “almost dead letter” because of 
the inconvenience it did cause to share trade (Collins, 1882, pg.275). 
10 Since 1826, under 6 Geo.IV, c.46 the liability of shareholders in unlimited liability British banks extended 
for three years after the sale of the shares. 
11 It’s worthy noticing that the CGB’s winding up caused the bankruptcy of 1559 out of the 1813 CGB’s 
shareholders. 599 of these failures took place after the first call on the shares. A rather large proportion of 
the shareholders didn’t have the means to face even the minimum call on them, i.e. the first call equal the 
negative capital (£5,190,000) divided the total number of shares (8450). That suggests that the process of 
vetoing shares’ transfer didn’t reach its objective to guarantee the admittance of solvent shareholders and it 
didn’t reduce the need for shareholder to monitor each other’s wealth. 
   17
liquidation was cancelled and the bank did resume activity)
12.  
The evidence from this case suggests that the sort of legislation and arrangement that can 
make unlimited liability effective though cumbersome may still be of dubious effectiveness. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In  this  paper  we  have  investigated  haw  joint  and  several  unlimited  liability,  pro  rata 
unlimited liability and unlimited liability affect asset prices when they are set according to 
the CAPM. The use of this model allows to highlight that determining the price of a whole 
company and the value of single shares are two different issues. The choice of liability 
regime affects the two issues in different ways.  
  Joint and several or prorata unlimited liability can be contrasted with limited liability 
as far as the value of a whole company is concerned, and contrary to what many author 
suggest limiting liability does have an effect on company value. 
   Prorata unlimited liability and limited liability are two regime that generate the same 
relationship between the price for the whole company and the price for single shares. Both 
regimes  generate  for  shareholders  the  same  information  costs  and  the  incentive  (no 
incentive) to restrict shares transferability. If the benefits from different liability regime are 
investigated  in  relation  to  these  two  aspects,  the  two  regimes  are  equivalent.  Capital 
markets  could  develop  and  work  in  the  same  way  under  either  regime.  The  benefits 
connected to the establishment of modern type capital markets are then common to both 
regimes  and  the  prevalence  of  one  regime  over  the  other  can  be  connected  to  other 
features of the liability regimes.  
  Empirical evidence supports our findings and show how markets are very resilient 
organisation that can properly handle unlimited liability. 
  The prevalence of the unlimited liability regime over regimes of unlimited liability, 
prorata (or joint and several) should then be traced in other benefits that limiting liability 
may bring like the reduction in the costs of enforcing stockholders’ liability. The theoretical 
literature  points  in  fact  to  the  relationship  between  bankruptcy  procedures  and  liability 
regimes as the crucial area where the limited liability regimes may be more cost effective 
and easier to implement. Case studies on the failure in the eighteen eighties of large British  
__________ 
12 Rielaborating Acheson’s and Turner’s data the ownership of the bank appears to have been the following: 
the bank’s capital was divided in 10,000 shares, the bank itself held 1,513 of them, the top 20 shareholders 
owned 15,6% of the total bank’s capital (1,560 shares) another 64 shareholders held more than 20 shares 
each (no less than a total of 1,280) shares, the remaining 1719 shareholders  held no more and certainly less 
than a total of 5,625 shares.  This suggests that out of 1813 shareholders, 1719 held no more (and very likely 
quite less) than 3,28 shares each and that would indicate some more unravelling than the authors maintain.   18
 
banks show that the effectiveness of limited liability is fact related to the existence of very 
tight institutional arrangement . 
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Appendix  
The  mean-variance  approach  to  finance  is  based  on  a  constraint  maximization  model. 
Investors’ goal is to maximize their utility and their utility only depends on the mean and 
variance of the return they get from their investments. Their wealth is the constraint to their 
behaviour and the allocation of the wealth between different assets is the choice they have 
to do. Each asset generates a return which is defined as a random variable with a known 
expected  value  and  a  finite  and  known  variance.  Different  portfolios  generate  different 
combinations  of  expected  return  and  return’s  variability.  Since  the  investors’  utility  is 
positively related to the portfolio’s expected return (m) and negatively related to return’s 
variability  (measured  by  the  returns’  standard  deviation  s),  of  all  possible  portfolios, 
investors only consider those that generate the highest expected return for any given level 
variability.  The set containing these portfolios represents the investors’ efficient opportunity 
set. When only two assets exist, one asset generating a certain return (i.e. a return mf with 
no variability i.e. standard deviation sf equal to zero, in other term a riskless asset) and one 
asset  generating  an  higher  but  variable  expected  return  (mj>mf,  sj>0,  a  risky  asset)  the 
efficient opportunity set may be represented as a straight line in a mean-standard deviation 
space (fig.1).  The inclination (Q) of this line  is given by the ratio between the difference in 
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When more risky assets are included, the so called “mutual fund theorem” may be derived. 
According to this theorem for any investor the efficient opportunity set is a combination of 
the riskless asset and a portfolio (or mutual fund) containing the risky assets in a fixed   20
proportion. The efficient opportunity set has the same representation as in fig.1 and its 
inclination is given by the difference between the expected return of the mutual fund (mM) 
and  the  expected  return  of  the  riskless  asset  divided  by  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
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The  inclination  of  the  efficient  opportunity  set  may  be  interpreted  as  the  reduction  in 
expected return that must be accepted for a reduction of its variability. When all the assets 
traded in the market are included in the opportunity set the mutual fund coincides with the 
asset market and the inclination of the efficient opportunity set may be interpreted as the 
“price of risk reduction” i.e. the return you must forfeit to reduce the variability of the return 
or to reduce the risk of your portfolio. 
For any asset (j) that does belong to the efficient opportunity set the asset’s contribution to 
the portfolio expected return in relation to the asset’s contribution to the variability of the 
portfolio’s return (measured by the ratio between the portfolio’s return variance  and the 
covariance between the asset’s expected return and the portfolio’s expected return) will be 
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If the expected return on assets is defined as 
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where P is the asset price and E(C) is the expected pay-off from the asset, the equilibrium 
return relation becomes an asset pricing relation 






















.         [A.1] 
 
For an asset that represents a small fraction of the assets’ market, the price depends from 
market variables: the riskless asset’s return (mf), the market price of risk  reduction Q, the 
standard deviation of the market mutual fund pay-off σ(CM), and from asset features: the 
expected pay-off E(C)I  and the covariance between the asset’s and mutual fund’s pay-off 
s(CI, CM).  
If the term asset stays for a whole company PI will be the price for the whole company. If 
the ownership of the same company is divided in N shares and the expected payoff E(c) 
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The share’s price will be 
_______ 
4 According to this definition of asset return we have  ( ) j j j
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  or     for the market mutual fund.  
The covariance between asset j and the market mutual fund  becomes in terms of assets’ payoff : 
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and market mutual fund’s standard deviation becomes 
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.    [A.2] 
 
The relation between company’s price and share’s price rest on the relationship between 
company’s  and  share’s  payoff  and  on  the  relationship  between  company’s  and  share’s 
covariance with the market payoff. 









































































.      [A.3] 
A company is defined as a bundle of contingent claims associated with different states of 
the world. The contingent claims may be seen as the generation of net capital which may 
be positive under some circumstances or negative under other circumstances (net liabilities 
are left). For a known probability distribution of the different states of the world (lets assume 
there are l+m possible states of the world each occurring with probability πi; in l states of 
the world the net capital generated is negative and in m states of the world the net capital 
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and the covariance between the j-company’s and the marker payoff may be measured by 
 






M j C E C E M
i C j








p s . 
 
Joint and several unlimited  liability  
If the company’s stock is divided in N units the ownership of z units of stock will generate 
an expected payoff E(C)
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where  0 ≤ g < 1 represents the percentage of the negative payoff that a stockholder may 





 meaning that g  is not 





 meaning that g  may be 
affected by the amount of stock which is owned,. As far as the pricing of the company’s 
partial ownership is concerned we can derive the covariance between the expected payoff 
from the company’s partial ownership and the expected payoff from the market:: 
= M j, s . 
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  [A.5] 
 
and  recalling  that  g  =f(z)  the  price  of  partial  ownership  will  change  with  changes  in 
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From [A.4], [A.5] and [A.6] it’s clear that in a regime of unlimited liability the price of one unit 
of stock is unique only under special circumstances.  
 
Pro rata unlimited liability 
If the same company is set up in a regime of pro rata unlimited liability the price of single 

































































1     [A.7] 
 





















































































.        [A.8] 
 
Limited liability   26
If the same company is set up in a regime limited liability the expected payoff from the 
whole company becomes,  
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and the payoffs’ standard deviation will be 
 




































The limited liability regime affects the expected payoff form the company and its variability, 
increasing the first and decreasing the second. The price of the company as a whole is still 

































































And the relationship between the price of the company and the price of a single share is 
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If secondary market effects take place they could change the size of the expected positive 
payoffs in such a way that  
) ( ) ( C E C E ll = , 
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with strict inequality if secondary market effects take place, 
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